Introduction
The focus of this paper is the means by which welfare recipients, in particular single mothers with children, respond to changed work incentives. The standard labour supply model assumes that workers can choose freely their utility-maximising hours of work at any given wage. Under this model, one would only observe changes in hours of work by an employee if she received a higher wage offer or if her working hour preferences changed. In particular, neither of these should be related to job changes. New welfare rules for lone mothers change their optimal working hours. Using panel data we look at the means by which single mothers realize their new preferred working hours. We find that changes in working hours are primarily achieved through changing jobs which we take as evidence for in-work rigidities in the Australian labour market.
A second contribution of this paper is to examine how different policies affect different sub-groups of targeted potential workers. We show that non-workers and those already working respond to different incentives. This illustrates that fixed costs of working may be an important element in modeling labour supply. Workers and potential workers with different education levels appear to have different channels of response to the reforms we consider. The presence of child care subsidies as part of the reform also interacts with education levels of lone parents.
As in many countries, labour supply of women with children in Australia, particularly lone mothers, is lower than other demographic groups. Figure 1 shows, however, that since about 2005, the employment rate of lone mothers has been increasing. At the same time, two sets of reforms were introduced to encourage labour supply through reducing work disincentives associated with transfer programs and assisting families with the cost of child care. Lone mothers were particularly targeted in these reforms. The first reform, introduced in 2004, reduced the rate at which benefits were reduced as income increases (the taper rate) for family tax credits in Australia. The second set of reforms, introduced in 2006, consisted of two policy changes: the rules for qualifying for the primary income support payment for single parents were tightened by restricting the age of the youngest child in the household and a new tax rebate for child care expenses took effect. These 2 reforms are described more fully below.
The paper is motivated by examining the following question: Is the observed increase in lone mothers' labour supply a coincidence or can it be attributed, at least in part, to those reforms? One stated purpose of the reform was to increase work incentives for lone mothers and our paper provides estimates of the impact and effectiveness of the reform.
To answer this question we look separately at the changes in working hours for those already working and the effect on participation for non-workers and for all workers.
For our study of changes in working hours, we separate hours changes for those who stay in the same job and those who change jobs. In doing so, we hope to shed some light on the presence of possible rigidities in the Australian labour market. The literature has shown that workers' choices of hours within a job are limited and wage and hours are often 'packaged' together-see for example, Ham (1982) , Moffitt (1984) , Lundberg (1985) , Paxson (1988, 1992) , Stewart and Swaffield (1997) , and Euwals (2001) . 1 As discussed in Altonji and Paxson (1988) , when hours are constrained within job, a worker may be able to increase her utility by jumping to another job that is closer to her supply curve, even without any wage change. Altonji and Paxson (1992) show that hours changes (and changes in preferred hours) are significantly larger for quitters than non-quitters. Blundell, Brewer and Francesconi (2008) , whose approach we largely follow in conducting our analysis, studied labour supply changes for single, British females in response to three reforms in the 1990s that affected work incentives.
They conclude that the reforms led to a significant increase in single mothers' hours of work and that in Britain, hours of work are not very flexible and the adjustments were largely through job changes rather than hours changes with the same employer.
We use a quasi-experimental approach and the difference-in-differences estimator to evaluate the reforms. The reforms we study did not affect single, childless women who we use as a control group. Ex ante predictions of reforms on the basis of partial equilibrium, theoretical models fail to take into account indirect effects of reform. In our case, for example, child care providers may increase prices in response to increased subsidies and this would have the effect of dampening the effects of the reform we study.
1 Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) have reviewed this literature.
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Many studies have used similar approaches to evaluate reforms in the UK, the US, Canada and Australia. Eissa and Liebman (1996) , Hoynes (2004), Ellwood (2000) , and Hotz, Mullin and Scholz (2002) studied the labour market impact of the Earn Income Tax Credit (EITC) reforms during the 1980s and 1990s in the US. These studies confirmed that EITC can explain a significant part of the rise in employment of women with children in the US over those periods (see Hotz and Scholz (2003) for more discussion). In the UK, the impacts of reforms related to Family Credit and Working Families' Tax Credit were investigated by Gregg and Harkness (2003) , Klaauw (2004, 2007) , Leigh (2005) , Blundell, Brewer and Shephard (2005) , Brewer, Duncan, Shephard and Suárez (2006) , and Blundell et al. (2008) . Card and Robins (1998) examined the 'Self-Sufficiency' experiment in Canada. A consensus among these studies is that those programs led to increases in employment of women with children.
Yet, Blundell et al. (2008) seems to be the only one that studies the mechanism through which these effects are achieved. In Australia, Doiron (2004) uses repeated cross-sections of data from the Income Distribution Survey to evaluate the impact of the 1987 reform of Single Parent Pension. She finds that the reform increased lone mothers' labour force participation but their hours of work decreased. However, without longitudinal data, she was unable to investigate how adjustment occurred.
As noted in Blundell et al. (2008) , it is essential to have long panel data to analyse the transition of labour supply over time. For our analysis, we use the first nine waves of the Household Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia Survey, which began in 2001.
We find evidence that the reforms increased working hours of workers and subsequent employment of non-workers. The probability of continuing to work for those already working was unaffected. The adjustment in hours of work was largely through changing employers providing evidence of labour market rigidities. This is similar to what was found in the U.K. in the 1990s. The two sets of reforms brought different results and the impacts were heterogenous. The 2004 reform had positive effects on working hours of lone mothers, but only through job changes. The effects were concentrated among lone mothers with lower levels of education and with fewer and older children. We do not find employment effects of the 2004 reform. In contrast, the 2006 reform affected 4 the employment probability of those who were not working prior to the reform. As the reform had both a work incentive aspect and a lowering of the cost of working (through the child care tax rebate) aspect, this conforms to our expectations. The increase in participation was particularly important for lone mothers with lower education levels and with fewer and older children. The 2006 reforms increased working hours of the employed, but primarily for women with higher levels of education. The tax offset nature of the child care reforms were such that the reform was more valuable for those with higher wages and incomes.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows, Section 2 summarises the principle government benefits paid to lone parents and the reforms to those payments introduced since 2004. The approach, the identifying assumptions, and model specification are discussed in section 3. We present the data in section 4. The results are summarised in section 5 and we discuss sensitivity analysis and robustness checks in sub-section 5.4.
We conclude in Section 6. PPS is a pension paid to low-income, single parents with children under the age of 16. One important contextual aspect of the Australian income support system is that 'pensions' are more generous than 'allowances' and this difference grows over time because pensions are indexed to Average Weekly Earnings (AWE) whereas allowances are indexed to the Consumer Price Index which rises less quickly than AWE. In the second set of reforms which we discuss below, some lone parents who received PPS were moved from a pension to an allowance which was both less generous at that point in time and which was going to grow more slowly over time. New Start Allowance-a less generous unemployment benefit which also includes a more onerous training and job search requirement. Not all single parents were affected as those on the PPS program prior to the legislative changes were treated under the old rules provided that their relationship status remained unchanged and that they never had any payments cancelled. The PPS payments continued to these individuals as before, however, these individuals also faced a more onerous training and job search requirement once their youngest child turned 8. Importantly, single parents who were already working were unaffected by these changes. 
Approach

Identification
We use single, childless women as a comparison group for single mothers and the 'difference-in-differences' approach to identify the effects of the policy. 10 The first key identifying assumption of this approach is that single childless women are not affected by the reforms. Given that we are analyzing administrative rule changes which did not apply in any way to single, childless women, this assumption would appear to be met. The second key identifying assumption required is that no other factors affected the two groups differently over the same period. The period that we analyze was one of robust economic and job growth in Australia, the benefits of which seemed to be spread across most demographic groups. We can not find any reason why employment and hours changes, the variables we analyze, would have been affected differentially for these two groups apart from the reform. Many other studies use childless women as a control group for lone mothers (see Eissa and Liebman (1996) , Gregg and Harkness (2003) , Francesconi and Klaauw (2007) and Blundell et al. (2008) ). 11
We present regression estimates in what follows. We check the validity of our regression estimates and the validity of the comparison group in a number of ways. We compare the characteristics of our treatment and control group; we use nonparametric matching; and we restrict the sample in various ways all of which are described below in section 5. Our results are robust to these alternative approaches. In order to avoid the 10 For discussions of the approach, see Ashenfelter (1978) , Heckman and Robb (1985) , Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) , Meyer (1995) and Angrist and Kruger (1999) .
11 Doiron (2004) uses married mothers as a control group. This would be inappropriate in our case as married mothers were affected by the reforms we analyze such as changes in FTB-B. The legislative reform packages we analyze also had other changes which applied to couple-headed households.
confounding effect of changes in labour force status which are caused by the birth of a child or changes in relationship status, we restrict our estimation sample to those individuals who are lone mothers in both waves and those who are single, childless women in both waves. We thus do not analyze any impact which the reforms might have on fertility or relationship status which are likely to be very small.
One issue for comparability of our treatment and control groups is that the changing ages of children in the lone mother households across time will have labour supply effects which the single, childless women will not experience. In order to deal with this, we control for the changes in the number of children in different age ranges in the household.
The age ranges are chosen to reflect schooling availability and differing care demands for children of different ages. We also, in the sensitivity tests presented below, restrict the sample to lone mothers whose children remain in the same age group before and after the policy change. Our results do not appear to be sensitive to this issue.
We specify three different models to analyse the effect of the reforms: (1) change in hours worked conditional on working before and after the reforms; (2) the probability of being employed conditional on not-working before the reform; (3) unconditional probability of employment.
Changes in working hours for workers
To investigate the possible channels through which hours adjustment occurs for lone mothers in response to the exogenous policy change, we specify an hours change model following Blundell et al. (2008) , who also examine annual changes, as:
where LP t indicates that the observation is a lone parent at time t, I(w) is an indicator equal to one if condition w is true and JC t+1 is an indicator for a job change between t and t + 1. ∆h it+1 denotes the change in total weekly hours worked between year t and t + 1; X it is a vector of observables including levels measured at t and the changes between t and t + 1; and ϵ it captures unobserved impacts on hours changes These four parameters are the difference-in-difference estimators for the two reforms estimated separately for the group who change jobs and for those who stay in the same job. As noted by Blundell et al. (2008) , equation (1) may suffer from an endogeneity problem if some omitted factor influences both the job change and the hours change.
However, as they state, it helps to provide an 'indication of the possible presence of imperfections or technological rigidities' in the labour market. By controlling for an individual's expressed desire to work more or less we reduce this source of endogeneity.
Equation (1) is a flexible specification with group-specific discrete jumps after the reforms for job stayers (α 31 , α 32 , b 1 and b 2 ) and for job changers (α 21 , α 22 , β 1 and β 2 ).
Employment probability for non-workers
The model for employment probability in the subsequent year of those who did not work at time t (L it = 0) is specified as
We estimate F as a linear probability model (we use a probit specification in sensitivity tests); η 2 reflects a linear time trend common to both lone mothers; 13 and η 31 and η 32 capture the shift in the employment probabilities after the reforms. X it includes a quadratic polynomial in age, number and changes in the number between t and t + 1 of children in four age groups (0 to 5; 6 to 12; 13 to 15; and 16 to 17), Englishlanguage ability and dummy variables for educational attainment and housing tenure (renter/owner).
The key policy parameters are ϕ 1 and ϕ 2 which capture the treatment effects of the 2004 and 2006 reforms, respectively.
Unconditional employment probability
Similar to equation (2), the probability of employment of all lone mothers and single childless women is given by
where G is a linear probability function. The difference from equation (2) is that the dependent variable is contemporaneous with the right-hand side control variables. X it contains the same set of control variables as equation (2) We focus on the labour supply of 2,676 lone mothers and single, childless women of working age (between 15 and 64) excluding those who are students, permanently unable to work or self-employed. This number also excludes a handful of observations with missing data on key variables. We are left with 9,239 observations which we use to analyse the unconditional probability of employment (equation (3)). For the analysis of hours changes for workers (equation (1)), we restrict the sample to those whose status as lone parents or single, childless women is unchanged and who are are working for two consecutive waves. This provides 3,565 observations on 1,214 women. The sample used to estimate the employment probability conditional on not working in the previous year (equation (2) likely to participate in the labour force and, when they do work, work fewer hours. The biggest difference is between the non-working lone mothers and their single, childless counterparts. The latter group is much older (with average age of 53 years). This may invalidate one of our identification requirements. We check this by restricting the age of the comparison group to 50 or less in one of the sensitivity tests which we conduct and describe below in section 5.4. The lone parents and single, childless women who work are more comparable in their characteristics, and they are better educated than the nonworkers. However, their labour supply differs. The lone mothers are more often casual workers, work fewer hours and are less likely to report being under-or over-employed. however, we can see that the difference in the patterns of remaining employed for workers is less pronounced. Figure 7 confirms the overall increase in lone mothers' employment across our sample period.
Results
We estimate each model for the full sample and also for various sub-samples partitioned by mother's education, number of children and age of youngest child, to analyse potential heterogeneity of policy effects. For the sake of conciseness, we only report the main parameter estimates. Full regression results are available on request.
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Channel of hours adjustment for workers
In Table 2 , we present the parameter estimates of the treatment effects of the reforms on lone mothers' working hours. In the first column we present results from estimation on the full sample with the remaining columns providing estimates on selected sub-samples of interest.
For those who stay in their jobs we find no effect of the reforms on working hours- For the 2006 reforms, we do not find a statistically significant effect of the reforms when we consider the entire sample. However, we do find a statistically significant effect on working hours for women with tertiary education of about 7.6 hours per week. This effect operates through the channel of changing jobs. This seems consistent with the CCTR reforms of 2006. Even before the reforms, women with tertiary education earn more and use more child care, CCTR is not means-tested and CCTR is only valuable when there is a tax liability to be offset. Thus the value of CCTR is higher for these women. 15 The changes to PPS eligibility were not expected to influence working hours for workers as women who were already working were not impacted by these reforms.
So in the case of changes in working hours for those already working our evaluation of the 2006 reforms can be considered an evaluation of the introduction of CCTR.
We can also see from Table 2 that a self-reported desire to work more or less hours is highly predictive of future hour changes. Those who report wanting to work more increase their work hours by 3.5 hours per week on average relative to those who are satisfied with their hours whereas those who report wanting to work less decrease their work hours by 2.5 hours per week on average relative to those who are satisfied with their hours.
Overall, the results provide evidence that there are important within-job hour restrictions in the Australian labour market. Changing jobs appears to be an important channel for all workers to respond to the 2004 policy reforms. It is also the primary channel by which higher educated workers respond to the 2006 reforms. reform did not have a particularly strong employment incentive for those not already employed and our insignificant parameter estimate can be interpreted as an indication that the modest improvements to work incentives were outweighted to a great degree by fixed costs of working for non-workers.
Subsequent Employment of Nonworkers
We also estimated equation (2) for workers (that is, conditional on working at time t) but omit the results for conciseness. We find no effects of the reforms (ϕ 1 and ϕ 2 are both statistically insignificant) which is consistent with our expectation that neither reform should lead to a shift in employment probability for those already employed.
Employment of All Lone Mothers
In addition to analyzing employment effects conditional on previous employment status, we estimated the unconditional employment probability for all lone mothers and single childless women (equation (3)). The key parameters are presented in Table 4 . The 
Sensitivity Tests
To check the specification, the functional form, the validity of the common support assumption and the potential impact of other factors, we conducted a range of sensitivity tests for each of the estimated equations. First of all, for the two conditional equations, although we controlled both the level and the change in the number of children in each age group, aging of the children could still confound the estimated treatment effect as discussed above. To further reduce the impact of children's aging (although we can never completely remove it), we further restrict the sample to observations where the youngest child remains in the same age group at t and t + 1. Secondly, to check whether there is a problem caused by non-random attrition, we restrict the sample to individuals who were observed in at least 6 waves. Thirdly, we estimate the model excluding the ninth wave. Because CCTR changed (it was increased from 30 to 50 percent as of July 2008) and the on-set of the Global Financial Crisis may have affected our two groups differently (although we think this is unlikely), the ninth wave may be quite different from other waves.
In addition, including many covariates in the models may make it harder to find over-lapping groups with the same characteristics in both the treatment and control groups. In the treatment literature this is called the common support problem. To see whether this affects our results, we combine the difference-in-difference estimator with propensity score matching. We re-estimated equations (2) and (3) with local linear regression matching (see for example, Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997) and Fan (1992) ). For equation (1), we used linear regression matching as the number of observations in each cell is too small to undertake a non-parametric approach. Equation (2) was also estimated with the comparison group restricted to be 50 years of age or younger as discussed above. All equations are also estimated without controls, and where possible, using a probit functional form. Lastly, a natural way to check the condition that the untreated response changes are the same across the treatment and control groups is to backtrack one period and examine the response changes in two pre-treatment periods.
If the condition does not hold in the pre-treatment periods, then a pre-treatment gap may exist.
The key results of these sensitivity tests are summarised in Tables A1, A2 and A3, respectively. By and large, these results show that the estimates of the benchmark model (the first column of each table) are robust. In particular, the last column in each table shows that pre-treatment gaps do not exist so the assumption that the untreated response changes are the same across the treatment and control groups appears to hold.
Conclusions
The classical labour supply model predicts that changed welfare rules will alter women's optimal labour supply. Preferred hours will change for those who are working and the decision to participate for workers and non-workers will also be affected. That model assumes that workers can adjust hours of work at will within their present employment relationships.
Our paper illustrates the relationship between different policy designs and heterogenous labour supply outcomes for lone mothers. We find that two reforms which changed the work incentives for lone mothers in Australia increased working hours of those who were working and employment of non-workers, but that they had no effect on the continued probability of remaining in employment for workers. The adjustment in working reforms contributed to an increased probability of employment in subsequent periods for those who were not working pre-reform. Again, effects were concentrated among lone mothers with lower education and with fewer and older children. The 2006 reforms also increased hours of work for higher educated lone mothers who were already employed.
Again, working hours changes occurred through the channel of changing employers.
These results highlight some caveats to the standard model. First, in-work rigidities appear to exist. The ability of policy changes to induce working hour changes therefore may be enhanced or diminished by the degree of dynamism in the labour market. Second, some reforms seem to have no effect on participation. This is consistent with important fixed costs of working which should be accounted for when modeling labour supply.
Third, tightened welfare rules appear to have larger effects on those with lower education whereas increased child care tax rebates have a larger impact on those with higher education. This is consistent with the higher incomes of those with more education and the nature of the child care subsidy which is delivered through a tax rebate. 6,513 Standard deviations are in the parentheses; Job related characteristics are for workers only. Level variables are for t; changes are from t to t + 1; and the rate of employment of the nonworkers are for t + 1. 'Workers in t and t + 1'/'Nonworkers' are conditional on being lone mothers/single women in both t and t + 1. 9,239 6,740 9,239 9,239 8,187 9,239 9,239 t-values calculated using robust standard errors are in the parentheses. * Significant at 10% level. ** Significant at 5% level.
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